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Constitutional rights without rellledies:
judicial review of underinclusive legislation
When a law treats differentially groups that ought to be treated identically, courts can
invalidate the statute or expand it to include the formerly excluded. The result, the
authors say, can be the affirmation of a right-without a remedy for the plaintiff.
By Bruce K. Miller and Neal E. Devins
n the face of it, the recent
decisions of People v. Liberta1 from the New York
Court of Appeals, and Heckler v. Mathews 2 from the United States
Supreme Court, have nothing in common. One is a rape appeal, the other a
Social Security case; one is a landmark,
rightly celebrated in the popular press, 3
the other a doctrinally insignificant approval of a temporary statute that has
already expired; one is expansive in its
reading of the equal protection guarantee, the other cautious, consolidating in
tone. Liberta and Mathews converge
only in their similar treatment of the
apparently mundane question of how a
court ought to go about remedying an
impermissibly underinclusive statutory
classification, that is, a law which treats
differently people or groups which ought
to be treated the same. By approaching
this question in a manner that ignores
the realities of the litigation process, the
two decisions have together articulated a
doctrine that threatens our most fundamental assumptions about judicial review in constitutional cases.

0

Substantial portions of the discussion of Heckler v.
Mathews in this essay are drawn from a previously
published article by one of the authors. Miller, Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes,
20HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79(1985). The editors of
that journal have graciously consented to the authors' republication of excerpts from that article.
I. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 485 N.Y.S. 207 (1984).
2. 465 u.s. 728 (1984).
3. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1984, at I.
4. N.Y. Penal Law §§130.00, subd. 4, 130.35
(McKinney 1984).
5. 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 485 N.Y.S. at 213.
6. Jd. at 170,485 N.Y.S. at 218.
7. Jd. at 171,485 N.Y.S. at 218.
8. Id. at 171-72, 485 N.Y.S. at 218.
9. Id. at 172, 485 N.Y.S. at 219.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§402(b), (c), (e), (f) (1982).
II. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).

People u Liberta
4

Untill984, a New York statute exempted
from prosecution husbands who raped
their wives if the spouses were living
together at the time of the rape. Because
Mario Liberta was not living with his
wife when he sexually assaulted her in
1981, he was prosecuted and convicted of
raping her. He appealed his conviction,
arguing that the marital exemption was
unconstitutional and that New York's
rape statute could not therefore be enforced against him.
In a unanimous, landmark decision,
the New York Court of Appeals agreed
with Mr. Liberta that the marital rape
exemption was invalid. Judge (now
Chief Judge) Wachtler's opinion for the
court affirmed the right of a married
woman to control her body, 5 thereby
underscoring the willingness of our judiciary to protect an indispensable condition of human freedom. In this respect,
the decision honors the most basic aspirations of our legal system.
But after holding the marital exemption unconstitutional, the court of appeals nonetheless allowed Mario Liberta's rape conviction to stand. Proceeding
from the premise that "when a statute is
constitutionally defective because of underinclusion, a court may either strike the
statute, and thus make it applicable to
nobody, or extend the coverage of the statute to those formerly excluded," 6 Judge
Wachtler saw the court's remedial task as
"to discern what course the legislature
would have chosen to follow if it had
foreseen our conclusions as to underincl usiveness." 7 Not at all surprisingly, "the
inevitable conclusion [was] that the legislative would prefer to eliminate the [mari-

tal] exemptions and thereby preserve the
[rape] statutes." 8 Accordingly, since the
statutes under which Mr. Liberta "was
convicted [were] not being struck down,
his conviction" 9 was affirmed.

Heckler u Mathews
The Social Security Act has long provided spousal benefits for the wives,
husbands, widows, and widowers of retired and disabled wage earners. Spousal
benefits are based on the earnings of the
retired or disabled wage earner. 10 Prior to
December, 1977, the Act demanded that
men seeking spousal benefits demonstate dependency on their wage-earner
wives for one half of their support.
Women, on the other hand, could qualify for benefits without having to make a
similar demonstration of dependency on
their husbands.
In March, 1977, the Supreme Court, in
Califano v. Goldfarb,u held this genderbased dependency test unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The Court concluded
that the male-only dependency test resulted in the work of females (whose husbands had to prove dependency) providing less protection to their families in the
form of benefits than the work of males
(whose wives automatically received the
government pension). To eliminate this
inequity, the Court invalidated the maleonly proof-of-dependency requirement.
In response to this decision, Congress,
in December, 1977, amended the Social
Security Act. First, Congress eliminated
the male-only dependency test. Second,
Congress enacted a "pension offset" provision which required that spousal benefits be reduced by federal/state govern151

ment pensions. This offset provision
was designed to rectify the substantial
increase in Social Security payments
caused by the elimination of the dependency test. Third, apparently concerned
about the effect of the new offset provisions on those persons (women and men
who could prove dependency) who had
planned their retirements on the assumption that they would receive full unreduced spousal benefits, Congress chose
to exclude this group of individuals
from the pension offset requirement for
a five-year grace period. In order to effectuate this result, Congress incorporated
into the offset exception the dependency
test found unconstitutional in Goldfarb.
Fourth, Congress, recognizing that the
dependency test might be invalidated,
included a severability clause in the legislation. This provision would have nullified the "pension offset" exception, if
the dependency test were found unconstitutional in this context. 12
After retiring from his job with the
Post Office, RobertMathews applied for
Social Security husbands' benefits under
the 1977 Amendment on the basis of his
wife's earnings record. But because he
could not satisfy the pre- Goldfarb dependency test, Mathews' Social Security entitlement was entirely offset by his federal pension. He then filed a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of both
the "pension offset" exception and the
severability clause. Mathews maintained
that the offset exception was an improper
reenactment of the gender classification
held unconstitutional in Califano v.
Goldfarb. His challenge to the severability clause had two elements. First, the
severability clause, by nullifying rather
than extending the offset exception, denied him an adequate remedy for an
unconstitutionally inflicted injury. In
other words, "men [could] vindicate their
constitutional right to equal protection
only be causing others to forfeit benefits
they have been previously entitled to."U
Second, the severability clause was an
improper curtailment of federal court
jurisdiction, since by prohibiting a reviewing court from granting adequate
relief to Mathews, it in effect eliminated
his standing to maintain the suit. 14
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected both arguments. The severability
clause, according to Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court, did not under152
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mine Mathews' standing to sue and
thereby threaten the Court's power to
correct constitutional violations, because
the right claimed by Mathews was not
the right to Social Security benefits but
rather the right to a benefit distribution
scheme that was free of unconstitutional
gender discrimination.15
Like the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Liberta, Justice Brennan
pointed out that a court which sustains a
claim of unconstitutional underinclusiveness "faces 'two remedial alternatives: [it] may either declare [the statute]
a nullity and order that its benefits not
extend to the class that the legislature
intended to benefit or it may extend the
coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by the exclusion.' " 16
A court should not, however, make this
choice in a way that "circumvent(s] the
intent of the legislature. " 17 Because the
severability clause clearly expressed Congress' "preference for nullification rather
than extension of the pension offset
exception in the event it is found invalid,"18 the proper remedy was obvious.
That remedy did not, however, have to be
implemented in Mr. Mathews' case because of Justice Brennan's finding that
the pension offset exception did not violate the equal protection guarantee. The
temporary reenactment of the pre-Goldfarb classification was permissible because it was substantially related to the
goal of protecting the reliance interests
of those who expected to receive benefits
under the pre-Goldfarb rules. 19

Impact on judicial review
The Liberta and Mathews decisions are
two prominent recent examples of a disturbing willingness of our most prestigious courts to entertain constitutional
challenges to statutes without granting
relief to the litigants who brought those
challenges forward. The remedial ap12. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-216, §§3!H(a)(2), (b)(l), (b)(2), (d)(l), (f), (g),
42 U.S.C. §§402(b)(4)(A), (c)(l)(C), (c)(2)(A),
(h)(l)(D),(n).
13. Appellee's Brief at 42, Heckler v. Mathews,
104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984).
14. Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 1jl4,313 at 2408 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982),
rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984). The district court sustained both of Mathews' arguments, holding the
offset exception unconstitutional and then labeling
the severability provision as an "adroit attempt to
discourage the bringing of an action by destroying
standing." The clause sought to "mandate the outcome of any challenge to the validity of the [pension offset] exception by making such a challenge
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proach taken in the two cases is most
visibly troubling because it moves the
courts away from their traditional and
most important role as arbiters of concrete disputes. The New York Court of
Appeals used Liberta's appeal as the occasion to end New York's marital rape
exemption, but its decision had no bearing on whether his rape conviction stood
or fell. Similarly, the Supreme Court
used Mathews' claim for Social Security
benefits as the vehicle for resolving the
constitutionality of the pension offset exception, but the resolution did not affect
his entitlement to the benefits he sought.
But on another level, one step removed
from the immediate interests of Liberta
and Mathews, the decisions are even
more disquieting. If taken seriously as a
guide to lower court judges on how to
think about remedying unconstitutionally underinclusive classifications, Liberta and Mathews could quickly cripple the process that brings such classifications to light.
It is a truism of our adversarial judicial system that courts do not declare
statutes unconstitutional on their own
initiative. They act only when asked to
do so by a person claiming to be harmed
by such a statute. 20 Thus the question of
the constitutionality of New York's marital rape exemption was before the court
only because Liberta, or, more precisely,
his lawyer, Barbara Howe of the Buffalo
Legal Aid Society, raised the issue.
Howe argued that because New York's
rape law arbitrarily exempted some husbands, but not Liberta, from prosecution for raping their wives, the statute
violated the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. Because the
rape statute was invalid, she contended,
Liberta could not properly be convicted
under it.
Howe did not challenge the marital
rape exemption in order to reform the
fruitless. This kind of 'in terrorem' approach insulates the legislative work product from judicial
review, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers." It was therefore "an unconstitutional
usurpation of judicial power." Id.
15. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 (1984).
16. Id. at 738.
17. ld. at 739, n.5 (quoting Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76, 93-94 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
lB./d.

19. ld. at 744-51.
20. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464,484 (1982).

law, to assure that husbands who rape
their wives be brought to justice, or to
protect the autonomy and bodily integrity of married women. Rather, as a
properly diligent criminal defense attorney, she was doing her best to secure the
reversal of her client's conviction. By
voiding the marital exemption while at
the same time affirming Liberta's conviction for rape, the court of appeals
assured that Howe won the battle but
lost the war.
It may be tempting at first glance to
view this outcome as justice triumphant.
The court's judgment both assures that a
rapist receives the punishment he deserves and removes an oppressive anachronism from the statute books. But we
cannot long have it both ways. The court
of appeals' message to lawyers such as
Howe is, in effect, "Don't bother challenging unconstitutionally narrow criminallaws. You may be right, but it won't
do your client any good. Because of public policy and legislative intent favoring
punishment of the guilty, his conviction
will stand anyway." The simple fact is
that if it does the client no good, if the
conviction stands anyway, the lawyer
will not assert the claim. And in the case
of a criminal statute, if the defense attorney does not raise a constitutional claim,
there is no one else in our system of justice who will, because there is no one else
who can.
Neither a victim of marital rape, nor
the government, acting as prosecutor in
her behalf, could have done anything to
prompt judicial review of the marital
exemption. Any attempt to prosecute a
husband for raping his wife without a
statute making that act a crime would
quickly (and properly) have been rebuffed as a violation of due process and
of the constitutional prohibition of ex
post facto Jaws. 21 In short, we depend on
lawyers such as Howe to point up the

constitutional flaws in our statutory law,
or we depend on no one.
For Mathews, the stakes are certainly
Jess serious than for Liberta, but the principle is exactly the same. So long as the
pension offset exemption nullification
clause is enforceable, Mathews and his
lawyers know that a lawsuit challenging
the exception as unconstitutional holds
no promise of securing the Social Security benefits he seeks. He can vindicate his
constitutional right to equal treatment
only by causing other, wholly innocent,
female recipients of Social Security
spouse's benefits to forfeit their entitlements. Few men in Mathews' position
will be so committed to the abstract
principle of gender equality or so callous about the consequences of a constitutional "victory" to challenge the offset
exception in the face of these realities.
Even fewer lawyers will be anxious to
litigate claims which hold no promise of
tangible return to their clients. 22
The Liberta and Mathews courts obviously did not intend their decisions to
obstruct access to judicial review. Rather,
in their zeal to defer to legislative remedial preferences and, in Liberta at least,
to fashion the most obviously just longterm result, both courts neglected a first
principle of American Jaw: at least where
the Constitution is concerned, if there's a
right, there's a remedy.
The importance of this principle is
underscored if we assume its oppositethat the Mathews and Liberta courts
were correct in denying a meaningful
remedy to the litigants before them.
Under this assumption, there is substantial reason to doubt whether the proper
conditions for adjudicating a constitutional challenge were met in either case.
Perhaps, contrary to Justice Brennan's
view, neither Mathews nor Liberta had
standing to raise his claim. In any event,
by failing to address the harms suffered

21. U.S. Const., art I, §9, cl. 3.
22. The constitutionality of the pension offset
exception was challenged in seven cases, all but one
filed prose. Webb v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, vacated and remanded for consideration in light of Heckler v. Mathews sub nom.
Heckler v. Webb, 104 S.Ct. 1583 (1984); Rosofsky v.
Schweiker, 523 F.Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), prob.
juris. noted, 456 U.S. 959, appeal dismissed, 457
U.S. 1141 (1982); Miller v. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, 517 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D.N. Y. 1981 );
Caloger v. Harris, 1981 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
~17,754 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 1981); Duffy v. Harris,I979
Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~ 16,906 (D.N .M. Oct. 23,
1979); Wachtell v. Schweiker, No. 80-8022 (S.D. Fla.

jan. 26, 1982), appeal filed, No. 82-5552 (lith Cir.
Apr. 30, 1982). The single case in which the plaintiff
was represented by counsel was Mathews v. Heckler,
1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~14,313 (N.D. Ala.
Aug. 24, 1982), rev'd 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984), where,of
course, the constitutionality of the severability
clause was also challenged.
23. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, •23, •)09.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137,
163 (1803).
26. 327 u.s. 678 (1946).
27. /d. at 684.
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
u.s. 579 (1952).

by the parties, both decisions begin toresemble advisory opinions more than
adjudications of real controversies.

Right to a remedy
The roots of the proposition that the
fashioning of a remedy for a constitutional wrong is essential to the process of
judicial review can be traced at least as
far back as Blackstone and, through
him, to Marbury v. Madison. 23 In the
Commentaries on the Laws of England,
Blackstone wrote:
It is a general and indisputable rule, that

where there is a legal right, there is also a
legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded .... It is a settled
and invariable principle in the laws of
England, that every right, when withheld,
must have a remedy, and every injury its
proper redress. 24
In a similar vein, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury:
The very essence of civil liberty lies in the
right of the individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury .... The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men. It will
certainly cease to observe this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the
violation of a vested legal right.25
More recently, the Supreme Court's
landmark 1946 decision in Bell v. H ood26
underscored the centrality of a court's
remedial power to the exercise of the
judicial function. In holding that a
damage action against FBI officers for
violations of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments was within the federal
question jurisdiction granted to district
courts, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, noted that:
It is established practice for this Court to
sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to
issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution and to restrain individual state officers from doing
what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the state to do. Moreover, where federally
protected rights have been invaded, it has
been the rule from the beginning that
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies
to grant the necessary relief. And it is also
well settled that where legal rights have
been invaded and a federal statute provides
for a central right to sue for that invasion,
federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done.27
Six years later, in the Steel Seizure case, 28

the Court applied these principles to
sustain a district court's issuance of a
153

preliminary injunction restraining enforcement of President Truman's order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to
take control of most of the nation's steel
mills. The Court based its affirmance on
its finding that "equity's extraordinary
... relief" 29 was the only means of assuring the threatened companies an adequate remedy for unconstitutionally inflicted injuries, despite the gravity of its
interference with the conduct of executive power in time of war.
Similarly, school desegregation litigation since the Supreme Court's second
Brown decision 30 has centered largely on
remedial issues and has been premised
on the idea that the constitutional right
to be free from officially imposed racial
segregation includes an adequate remedy
for the injury such separation inflicts. In
Green v. New Kent County School Board,
for example, the Court invalidated ineffective, voluntary freedom-of-choice
plans and demanded that school boards
come forward with a plan "that promises realistically to work now. " 31 Three
years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, 32
the Court upheld the use of mandatory
busing as a desegregation remedy, acknowledging that in order to eliminate
all vestiges of an unconstitutional dual
school system, the necessary remedies
may be "administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre. " 33
The proposition that vindication of a
constitutional right includes an adequate remedy has been confirmed more
recently by the Supreme Court's line of
decisions, beginning with Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 34 grounding the
availability of an adequate remedy for
constitutional violation in the Article III
powers of the federal courts. In Bivens,
the Court sustained a claim for damages
against federal agents for injuries caused
by a warrantless arrest and search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. There
was no federal statute authorizing such a
claim. Nevertheless, the damage award
was properly within the power of a federal court, because of the principle announced in Bell v. Hood, i.e., that "where
legal rights have been invaded ... courts
will ... grant the necessary relief. " 35 The
Court then emphasized that an effective
remedy was inherent in the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment:
154
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From the earliest days
of the republic, it
has been fundamental
that an injured person
is entitled to relief
from that injury.

[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether the availability of money damages is necessary to
enforce the Founh Amendment. For we
have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal
officer's violation of the Founh Amendment may not recover damages from the
agents, but must instead be remitted to
another remedy, equally effective in the
eyes of Congress.36

Bivens thus acknowledges the primary
responsibility of Congress over remedies
for injuries inflicted by the unconstitutional conduct of federal officials, but
also underscores the power of the federal
courts to afford constitutionally sufficient relief in the event Congress fails to
carry out that responsibility. 37
The duty of the federal courts to provide relief for unconstitutional injuries
is in no way incompatible with a broad
reading of Congress' power, under the
"exceptions" clause of Article III of the
Constitution, to regulate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Even if the exceptions power authorizes
29. /d. at 384.
30. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
31. 391 u.s. 430, 439 (1968).
32. 402 U.S. I (1971).
33. ld. at 28.
34. 403 u.s. 388 (1971).
35. 327 U.S. at 684.
36. 403 U.S. at 397.
37. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Bivens principle on three occasions since announcing
it in 1971. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(authorizing damage remedy for congressional staff
member unconstitutionally discharged on the basis
of gender); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980)
(authorizing damage claim for parent of federal
prisoner whose death was caused by official failure
to provide medical care); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 ( 1983) (affirming dismissal of federal employee's
damage claim for violation of First Amendment
rights, on ground that remedies provided by civil
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Congress to exempt particular classes of
constitutional claims from federal review, it cannot, consistent with the separation of governmental powers, be read
to permit Congress formally to grant the
power of review over such claims while,
at the same time, withdrawing the authority of a reviewing court to provide
relief to the injured claimant. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe has pointed out:
Congress may not so truncate the jurisdiction of an Article III court as to empower it
to 'decide' a legal controversy while denying
it any means to effectuate its. decision ....
Congress' broad authority to regulate the
panoply of available remedies, in other
words, stops short of the power to reduce an
Article III court to a disarmed, disembodied
oracle of the law lacking all capacity to give
tangible meaning to its decisions. 3B
If the federal courts are required to
provide adequate remedies for the violation of constitutional rights, the duties
of the state courts, under the supremacy
clause, cannot be any less. Nearly 40
years have passed since the Supreme
Court confirmed, in Testa v. Katt, 39 the
general obligation of state courts to
enforce federal constitutional rights violated by state policies or statutes. And
long before Testa, it was clear that such
enforcement entailed a duty to provide a
constitutionally sufficient remedy for
injuries caused by the violation. 4° From
the earliest days of the republic, then, a
fundamental assumption of our legal
order has been the proposition that a
person injured by unconstitutional government action is entitled to judicial
relief from that injury. 41

A crucial distinction
Judge Wachtler's opinion for the New
York Court of Appeals in Liberta did not
address the question of Liberta's right to
service commission regulation were constitutionally adequate).
38. Tribe, jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16
Harv. C. R.-C.L.L. Rev. 129 (1981).
39. 330 u.s. 386 (1947).
40. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 ( 1931 ); Ward v. Love County, 253
U.S. 17 ( 1920); General Oil Company v. Crain, 209
u.s. 211 (1908).
41. The general availability of a sovereign immunity defense to unauthorized damage suits
against federal and state governments does not
undercut this principle. In situations where sovereign immunity precludes an award of monetary
relief, the power of the federal courts to provide
constitutionally adequate alternative remedies becomes an integral element of the "paramount
authority of the Federal Constitution." Sterling v.
Constantin, 387 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932); see also,
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 236 (1908).

a remedy. Presumably, this omission was
prompted by Liberta's unambiguous
guilt of the act of rape, regardless of the
constitutionality of the marital rape exemption. But Liberta's guilt does not
alter the fact that in the case before the
court of appeals, the appeal of his conviction, it was he and only he who was
injured by the exemption. Unless his
injury can fairly be described as something other than the conviction itself,
there is no escaping the conclusion that
the court failed to perform its constitutional duty to provide him a remedy.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand,
did consider Mathews' right to a remedy.
He found, however, that Mathews' right
could be satisfied equally by either extension or nullification of the pension offset exception. The reason either remedy
was equally effective was that in Brennan's view, the injury suffered by
Mathews was not the denial of the Social
Security benefits he sought, but was
instead the gender "discrimination itsel£."42 Such discrimination,
by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the
disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and
therefore as less worthy participants in the
political community ... can cause serious
non-economic injuries to those persons
who are personally denied equal treatment
solely because of their membership in a
disfavored group.43
An adequate remedy for this injury could,
of course, "be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits for the favored class as
well as by the extension of benefits to the
excluded class. "44
This equation of the injury caused
Mathews by the pension offset exception
with the possible unconstitutionality of
the exception itself is, however, a transparent fiction. Its transparency is revealed by applying Brennan's methodology in Mathews to Liberta's appeal.
For Brennan, the injury suffered by
Liberta would not be his rape convic42. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, at 739.
43. /d. at 739-40.
44. /d. at 740.
45. ld. at 739.
46. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). Both the Mathews
and Liberia opinions invoke Justice Harlan's Welsh
concurrence as the starting point for their remedial
analysis. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738; People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 170,485 N.Y.S. at 218.
47. ld. at 337.
48. 50 U.S.C. app. §456(-) (Supp. IV 1964);
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336.
49. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341-43.
50. I d. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring in result).

tion, but rather the New York legislature's denial of his right to a statute criminalizing rape that is free of irrational
distinctions based on the marital relationship of the victim and perpetrator.
Such distinctions themselves, by "perpetuating archaic notions" and "stigmatizing members of the disfavored group" 45
cause serious injuries to the members of
that group.
To describe Liberta's injury in this
way is, of course, absurd. It is married
women raped by their husbands, not
rapists who are not married to their victims, who are stigmatized by the marital
rape exemption and thereby labeled as
less worthy participants in the political
community. This dehumanization of
women because they are married is the
reason why the marital exemption was
rightly eliminated by the Liberta court,
but it is not, in any sense, the injury
which prompted Liberta's appeal. That
injury remains his conviction for the
crime of rape.
The inadequacy of Brennan's characterization of Mathews' injury is confirmed by the opinion that provided the
foundation for the remedial dispositions
in both Mathews and Liberta: Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v.
United States. 46 Welsh concerned an appeal from a criminal conviction by a conscientious objector whose opposition to
war was based on ethical beliefs of a secular rather than a religious nature. 47 The
statute authorizing exemption from military service for conscientious objectors
had been construed by selective service
officials to limit objector status to those
whose opposition to war was grounded
in formal religious training and belief. 48
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected
this construction and reversed Welsh's
conviction on the ground that the statute
was broad enought to encompass his ethically rooted, but not traditionally religious, conscientious scruples. 49 Harlan
51. ld. at 301.
52. !d. at 362-63.
53. Welsh was, of course, a criminal appeal. It
might, for this reason, be argued that Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, while supporting Liberta's argument for reversal of his conviction, is of no
help in Heckler v. Mathews, a civil case. But the
proposition that a reviewing court's task is not
complete until it has remedied the injury caused by
an unconstitutional governmental action has long
been commonplace in civil cases. See, e.g., IowaDes Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239,
247 (1931).

could not accept the majority's reading of
the statute and was thus compelled to
reach the constitutional issue, which he
resolved by finding that the statutory distinction between religious and secular
beliefs amounted to an unconstitutional
establishment of religion, in violation of
the First Amendment. so
Harlan's disposition of the merits of
Welsh's appeal forced him to address the
question of the appropriate constitutional remedy. He began by stating the
proposition that was to serve as the starting point for both Judge Wachtler in
Liberta and Justice Brennan in Mathews:
Where a statute is defective because of
underinclusion, there exist two remedial
alternatives; a court may either declare [the
statute] a nullity and order that its benefits
not extend to the class that the legislature
intended to benefit, or it may extend the
coverage of the statute to include those
who are aggrieved by the exclusion. 5 '
The unconstitutionality of Welsh's injury could plainly have been remedied
by nullifying the exemption granted to
religious objectors. Nevertheless, nullification was, in Harlan's view, inadequate as a constitutional remedy. The
reason was that while nullification
would correct the unconstitutionality of
statutory exemption scheme, it would
not touch the injury suffered by Welshthe conviction for refusing induction
and corresponding prison sentence. This
injury could be redressed only by extending the benefit of conscientious objection to Welsh and others whose moral
opposition to participation in war was
grounded in secular rather than religious belie£. 52
The distinction is a critical one: When
confronted with an injury that is created
by an unconstitutionally underinclusive
statutory classification, the responsibility of a federal court is not simply to
correct the unconstitutionality but to
remedy the injury. In Liberta's case, this
means reversing the conviction. In
Mathews', it means directing payment of
his Social Security benefits.s3

Costs of a remedy
If, as we have argued, the non-remedies
dispensed by the Mathews and Liberta
courts indeed threaten the tradition of
judicial review of unconstitutional government action, it is only fair that we
acknowledge the far from trivial conse155

quences of our belief that the only justif- terms of legislative prerogatives, is small,
iable decisions were extension of Social especially in light of the countervailing
Security benefits in Mathews and nulli- danger to the effective exercise of judification of New York's rape statutes in cial review.
their entirety in Liberta. Mathews is, of
The short-term consequences of nullicourse, the easier case. Congress obvi- fying New York's rape statutes are obviously would retain the authority to re- ously more serious than those presented
spond to a Supreme Court decision ex- by a decision to disregard the Mathews
tending the pension offset exception to severability clause. Judge Wachtler feared
Mathews by prospectively repealing the that a judicial invalidation of the governexception entirely. Such a prospective ment's authority to prosecute rapists
repeal would neither interfere with a would have "catastrophic effects. " 54 Not
reviewing court's ability to grant relief to only would Liberta have to be released,
the litigants before it nor obstruct access but perhaps all persons ever arrested or
to judicial review by foreclosing any convicted for rape in the state of New
relief in advance of the filing of a lawsuit. York might be entitled to dismissal of the
Paradoxically, it is at least possible charge or reversal of the conviction. 55
that a decision to disregard the Mathews
It is at least conceivable, however, that
severability clause would entail very lit- the consequences of granting relief to
tle intrusion on the legitimate exercise of Liberta might not have been so dire. The
legislative power. Though the legisla- hiatus created by invalidating the rape
tive history is silent on the point, it is not statute would surely have been hastily
unreasonable to assume that any mem- repaired by the legislature. And United
ber of Congress who considered the States Supreme Court precedents offer
likely impact of the clause would have substantial leeway for limiting the retseen that its most immediate and predic- roactive application of a constitutional
table effect would be to stifle the incen- principle in order to avoid reopening
tive-and possibly the standing-of men criminal convictions. 56
denied benefits because of the underinEven so, it would be unfair to minimclusiveness to challenge the constitu- ize the costs of reversing Liberta's convictionality of the sex discrimination ef- tion. If New York's rape statute had been
fected by the exception. Such a disincen- held to be unenforceable, prosecutions of
tive would thus work to assure that the men awaiting trial on charges of rape,
harsh remedial option-nullification of many of them surely guilty, would have
the exception-envisioned by the clause to have been dropped. Liberta himself,
already found guilty of rape, would inwould never have to be invoked.
Under these circumstances, it becomes . deed have gone free. No one could responmuch more problematical to describe sibly argue that these are consequences
the severability clause, despite its facial we should accept easily or blithely.
clarity, as a reliable indication of C!JnBut the price of allowing the guilty to
gress' remedial intention in the event the go free is one our society has been willexception were declared unconstitu- ing to pay before (most notably in the
tional. The clause was, in a very real case of the rule excluding illegally sesense, purely hypothetical, in contrast cured evidence from admission at trial) 57
to, for example, a repeal of the exception in order to assure constitutional governenacted after adjudication of its uncon- ment. We believe it is a price that should
stitutionality or a direction (regardless have been paid in the Liberta case. By
of when enacted) that the constitutional- affirming his conviction, the New York
ity of the exception be assured by extend- Court of Appeals undermined the only
ing the benefits it confers. Each of these process that could have opened the way
latter prescriptions takes seriously the for its historic elimination of the marital
legislature's primary role as a dispenser rape exemption. If there are other unconof constitutional remedies. The offset stitutionally underinclusive statutes burseverability clause (along with other ied in New York's criminal code, we
provisions like it, which purport to deny wonder whether, after Liberta, they will
all remedies for constitutional injuries) reach the court's docket.
may, on the other hand, quite plausibly
be viewed as a legislative bluff. Bluffs of Conclusion
this sort should be called. The price, in On the face of it, the remedial decisions
156

judicature

Volume 70, Number 3 October-November, 1986

in People v. Liberta and Heckler v.
Mathews may seem unobjectionable. In
each case, the court approached the task
of correcting an unconstitutionally underinclusive statute by deferring to the
presumed wishes of the enacting legislature. In each case, the legislative preference was accurately gauged and unproblematically applied. And in Liberta,
where the court's remedial choice was
actually carried out, the result-extension of liability for rape to all husbands
-was plainly the only tolerable legislative policy choice.
This appearance, however, is highly
deceptive. The practical impact of Liberta and Mathews is to advise persons
injured by unconstitutionally underinclusive statutes that corrective litigation
cannot help them but can only harm
others. This message effectively chokes
off the litigation process and thereby
threatens to immunize such statutes from
judicial scrutiny. The remedial approach
of the Liberta and Mathews courts consequently undermines the power of
courts to hear and decide constitutional
claims, a result that is plainly inconsistent with the traditional goal of limiting
government through law.
If this practical impediment is taken to
mean that litigants such as Mathews and
Liberta do not have standing to present
their constitutional challenges, it will
present a formal bar to adjudication as
well. Many underinclusive statutes will
be theoretically as well as practically immune from challenge. The Liberta and
Mathews decisions thus fail to mask a
genuine dilemma: either there is a right
to a constitutional remedy or the Constitution does not really reach the issues the
two cases purported to resolve.
D
54. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 171,485
N.Y.S.2d at 218.
55. Id. at 173, 485 N. Y.S.2d at 320.
56. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 319 (1966); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
57. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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